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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellee Ollie Blair is from a final order of 
the Labor Commission of Utah dated July 15, 2010. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-
801(8)(a), 63G-4-403, and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Does Respondents' admission of medical causation preclude 
Respondents from challenging the extent of further compensability 
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418. 
Standard of Review 
The Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming 
before it. As such, the Court must uphold the Commission's 
determination unless the determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality."' McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 
UT App 10, 111, 41 P.3d 468 (alterations omitted) (quoting AE Clevite, 
Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, P7, 996 P.2d 1072). Whether a 
party waived a defense is reviewed for reasonableness. See Barnard & 
Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 401, If 5 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005). 
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2. Issue: Did the Commission apply the appropriate legal analysis? 
Standard of Review 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (4)(d), the Court of Appeals 
may grant relief from an agency action if the agency "has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law." Whether an agency has properly 
interpreted or applied agency-specific law is reviewed for correctness, 
unless an agency has been given a measure of discretion by statute. 
Harrington v. Industrial Comm'n, 942 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997); Terry v. Ret. Bd.. 2007 UT App 87, P7 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Drake 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
3 Issue: Where the Commission's findings of fact on the material 
issue of future medical care adequate under Utah law? 
Standard of Review 
Adequacy of an agency's factual findings is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 
181 (Utah 1997). 
4. Issue. Did the Commission properly determine that Petitioner does 
not require back surgery on and industrial basis? 
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Standard of Review: 
This is a challenge to the agency's factual findings. An agency's 
decision under the substantial evidence test does not require that the 
Court review the findings de novo. See Questar Pipeline v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). A party seeking to review an 
agency's order must show that the agency's factual determinations are 
not supported by substantial evidence. The reviewing court must 
examine the facts and all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the agency's findings. See Hales Sand & Gravel v. 
Audit Div., 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers Compensation Act"), 
the provision authorizing workers' compensation for industrial accidents 
reads as follows: 
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is 
injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury . . . such amount for 
medical, nurse, and hospital services . . . [and] 
medicines . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. 
The section emphasized above was interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 
(Utah 1986), to require a claimant to prove both medical and legal 
causation. 
In addition Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 reads as follows: 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial 
means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the 
injured employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question whether an employee is entitled to 
worker's compensation benefits arising from an industrial accident on 
May 12, 1999. 
Course of the Proceedings 
1. On February 17, 2007 Ollie M. Blair ("Petitioner") filed an 
Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total compensation, temporary partial 
compensation, permanent partial compensation, interest and travel 
expenses. The Petitioner claimed that on May 12, 1999 he injured 
his low back while working for Precision Tool. (R., 1-7). 
2. Precision Tool, Great American Alliance Insurance Co., and Ohio 
Casualty Insurance (collectively, "Respondents") filed an Answer on 
March 23, 2007 defending on the grounds that the Petitioner's 
surgery is not necessary to treat his industrial injuries. (R., 10-18). 
Respondents additionally attached a copy of the Independent 
Medical Evaluation of Dr. Gerald Moress to support this defense. 
3. A hearing on this matter was held on July 10, 2007. At the hearing 
the parties argued whether the medical care Petitioner sought in 
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his Application for Hearing was medically necessary. See R., 113 at 
3-5, 12-15. 
4. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued Findings of Fact and 
Interim Order on October 31, 2007, determining that the case 
needed to be sent to a medical panel regarding the necessity of 
medical treatment given the divergent opinions of Dr. Jodie Leavitt 
and Dr. Gerald Moress. (R., 36-38). The ALJ assigned Dr. Joseph 
Q. Jarvis to chair the panel; he associated Dr. Joel Dall as a 
member of the panel. 
5. The medical panel reviewed the Interim Findings, medical records, 
diagnostics, and examined the Petitioner. 
6. On March 6, 2008, the medical panel issued a report with the 
Adjudication Division. (R., 61-63). The medical panel opined the 
medical treatment provided to the Petitioner through June 9, 2000 
was necessitated by the Petitioner's industrial injuries. However, 
after that date, the Petitioner had returned to baseline with his 
preexisting degenerative condition (his industrially caused disc 
protrusion has resolved) and, therefore, any treatment rendered 
after that date was not necessitated by industrially-caused 
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conditions. Likewise, the panel found that any times of instability 
for work in 2007 were not caused by any industrial injury. 
7. Following this, on March 20, 2007, Petitioner filed an objection to 
the medical panel report, objecting to the report because the 
medical panel addressed issues of medical causation, an issue 
which had already been conceded by the Respondents. (R., 64-70). 
8. On March 28, 2008 Respondents filed a Response to Objections to 
the Medical Panel Report. (R., 71-72). Respondents argued that 
the panel correctly addressed the primary issue of medical 
necessity of surgery due the claimed industrial accident. 
9. On May 6, 2008 the ALJ entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order. (R., 73-77). The ALJ found Respondents' 
arguments persuasive and adopted the medical panel's report. The 
ALJ opined that admission of medical causation did not mean that 
Respondents were indefinitely liable for all future medical care, 
including the proposed surgery of Dr. Levitt. 
10. On June 5, 2008 Petitioner filed an Motion for Review of the ALJ's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R., 78-87). 
11. On June 25, 2008 Respondents filed a Response to the Motion for 
Review. (R., 88-94). 
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12. On July 15, 2010 the Commission entered an Order Affirming 
ALJ's Decision. (R., 108-111). The Commission agreed with the 
ALJ's rationale and affirmed the ALJ's Order. 
13. On August 16, 2010 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with this 
Court. 
Statement of Facts 
On May 12, 1999, Precision Tool employed the Petitioner as a 
welder/fitter. On this date, Petitioner was trying to center a 16M 200 lb. 
vertical piece of pipe down into a base plate. A crane held the pipe and 
Petitioner pushed and pulled on it with his hands, attempting to position 
it correctly. While pushing and pulling on the pipe the Petitioner felt a 
pop in his back, which "tightened up." (R., 113 at 19-22). The 
Petitioner thought things were alright and finished working his shift. 
On May 13, 1999 the Petitioner had pain in his back. He reported 
the accident and took the day off. (R., 113 at 22-23)). Shortly thereafter 
the Petitioner went to see Dr. Carston Johnson. (R., 113 at 23 ). 
An MRI on September 8, 1999, showed a disc herniation at L5-S1 
with thecal sac and exiting nerve root impingement. (R., 113 at 10). The 
medical panel determined that the accident apparently caused the disc 
protrusion. (R., 62.). 
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On February 6, 2007, a repeat MRI showed only degenerative 
changes in the Petitioner's low back. The herniation at L5-S1 was gone. 
R., 113 at 8-9.). The medical panel determined that the Petitioner's 
degenerative disc disease was not caused by the accident. (R., 62.). 
Over the years the Petitioner sought treatment for his back now 
and then when it would act up. (R., 113 at 45-46). 
On April 7, 2006, Mr. Blair was seen by Jodie Levitt, M.D., a 
surgeon. Dr. Levitt noted that Mr. Blair's "problems began in around 
1988 when he was moving some plate metal. He was told at that time 
that he had a herniated disc. More recently he has been having 
increasing problems." (R., 113 at 23) Dr.Levitt's report stated, among 
other things, that Mr. Blair had significant degenerative disc disease at 
L4/5 and that was probably the level giving Mr. Blair his low back pain. 
Eventually, Dr. Levitt recommended surgery. On February 7, 2007 Dr. 
Levitt completed a Summary of Medical Record indicating a medical 
causal relation between the industrial accident and the Petitioner's 
herniated disc. (R., 112 at 18). Dr. Levitt took the Petitioner off work 
from May 12, 1999 to May 16, 1999. She recommended surgery in the 
form of left L3-4 and L4-5 laminotomy, decompression and possible 
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discectomy. (R., 112 at 18.) Please note, those are not the levels at 
which Mr. Blair had the herniated disc after the industrial accident. 
Dr. Douglas Davis, D.C. took the Petitioner off work from April 10, 
2007 to April 15, 2007. (R., 112 at 41). 
On February 5, 2007 Dr. Gerald Moress performed an independent 
medical examination. He opined that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-4 
and L4-L5 would not relieve the Petitioner's pain and discomfort. (R., 112 
at 16). With regard to past care he opined that all has been necessary 
except the chiropractic care. He also opined that the Petitioner was at 
maximum medical improvement as of the Independent Medical 
Evaluation and that the Petitioner should continue on a self procured 
program of spinal stretching, strengthening, and cardiovascular exercise. 
A 2-3 week course of physical therapy will refresh the self-program and 
provide a good transition. (R., 112 at 17). 
Mr. Blair's brief states that the Respondents admitted that the 
accident was the medical cause of his low back aggravations and 
injuries. That is simply not true. The Respondents' Answer admitted 
that Mr. Blair suffered a compensable industrial accident on Mary 12, 
1999. (R., at 10-18). The Answer clearly stated the proposed surgery 
was not reasonable and necessary to treat the admitted compensable 
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injury.1 The Respondents' Answer also denied that Mr. Blair was entitled 
to an award of recommended medical care. In their Pre-Trial 
Disclosures, the Respondents clearly stated that their issues included 
whether the accident was the cause of Mr. Blair's ongoing complaints of 
pain and whether the Petitioner reasonably and necessarily required any 
additional medical care to treat the industrial injury. (R., at 32-3). 
A hearing on this matter was held on July 10, 2007. (R., 113). 
On October 31 , 2007, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact and Interim 
Order determining that the case needed to be sent to a medical panel 
regarding the necessity of medical treatment and any periods of 
instability for work. (R., 36-39). Following this, the medical panel issued 
its report, which concluded that the medical treatment provided to the 
Petitioner through June 9, 2000 was necessitated by the Petitioner's 
industrial injuries. However, after that date no additional care was 
warranted on an industrial basis. 
Following objections filed by Petitioner, the Commission entered an 
Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. (R., 108-111). The Commission agreed 
apparently, the Petitioner maintains that an admission of liability as 
to an industrial injury renders his employer liable for all of his future care, 
even if it is not related to the industrial accident. Recall that the September 
8, 1999 MRI showed a herniated disc at L5-S1. Dr. Levitt's proposed 
surgery was at L3-4 and L4-5 to treat degenerative processes in Mr. Blair's 
spine. 
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with the ALJ and denied Petitioner's claim for additional surgery. The 
Commission opined that Respondents' admission that the accident was 
the medical cause of Mr. Blair's injury did not preclude the Commission 
from adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr. 
Blair's work related low back problems. The Commission stated that even 
though Respondents admitted that the accident medically caused Mr. 
Blair to sustain a low back injury, such an admission does not imply that 
the accident caused all of Mr. Blair's low back problems following the 
accident. Therefore, the Commission concurred with Judge Marlowe's 
decision that Mr. Blair is not entitled to further benefits for his work 
related injury. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals should reject Petitioner's arguments and 
affirm the Commissions's Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. Respondents' 
admission of medical causation does not preclude further challenge to 
the extent of further compensability for ongoing medical and indemnity 
benefits. Indeed, the Commission and ALJ applied the appropriate legal 
analysis in this case by evaluating Petitioner's claim under Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-418. Under this standard, the court properly evaluated 
whether the claimant's request for low back surgery was medically 
necessary as a result of the industrial accident. 
The Commission's determination that Petitioner does not require 
surgery on an industrial basis is reasonable and rationale and supported 
by substantial evidence in the record including that of the medical panel 
and Dr. Gerald Moress. In addition, the Commission's findings are 
legally adequate since they cite to the material records that are relevant 
to the medical dispute. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED MR. BLAIRS CLAIM 
FOR FURTHER MEDICAL EXPENSES AND TEMPORARY TOTAL 
DISABILITY 
Point 1: Admission of Medical Causation Does Not Preclude 
Respondents From Challenging the Extent of 
Further Compensability 
Petitioner incorrectly argues that because Respondents did not 
challenge medical causation, they have waived their right to dispute what 
medical care is necessitated by the claimed industrial accident. As 
correctly determined by both the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission, Petitioner's argument lacks legal merit and is significantly 
flawed. 
The ALJ accurately notes in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order that while medical causation was conceded, that 
admission did not mean that Respondents were liable for all future 
medical care for the remainder of Petitioner's life, including the proposed 
surgery. Indeed, the ALJ correctly noted that in Respondents' Answer, 
they defended Petitioner's Application for Hearing on the grounds that 
Petitioner's claim for surgery and associated claim for temporary total 
disability was not necessary to treat the industrial accident based upon 
the Independent Medical Evaluation of Dr. Gerald Moress. (R., 75). 
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Given the divergence of medical opinions between Petitioner's treating 
physician, Dr. Leavitt, and that of Dr. Moress, the ALJ correctly remitted 
this matter to a medical panel who opined that while the treatment 
provided to Petitioner through June 9, 2000 was appropriate on an 
industrial basis, after that date Petitioner returned to baseline with his 
pre-existing degenerative condition and, therefore, any treatment 
rendered after that date was necessitated by non-industrial caused 
conditions. (R., 61-63). 
The Commission agreed with the ALJ's rationale holding as follows: 
Mr. Blair asserts that because Precision Tool admitted that 
the accident was the medical cause of his low back injury, the 
medical panel's findings related to medical causation are 
erroneous and Judge Marlowe's decision to deny further 
benefits based upon the panel's report is incorrect. However, 
Precision Tool's admission that the accident was the medical 
cause of Mr. Blair's injury does not preclude the Commission 
from adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the 
extent of Mr. Blair's work related low back problems. 
Even though Precision Tool admits that the accident 
medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a low back injury, such 
and admission does not imply that the accident caused all of 
Mr. Blair's low back problems following the accident. After 
examining Mr. Blair and reviewing his medical records, the 
medical panel determined that Mr. Blair suffered from a pre-
existing degenerative condition unrelated to his employment 
that caused his continuing low back problems. As a result, 
the panel concluded that Mr. Blair did not suffer any periods 
of instability in 2007 because of his work related injury and 
did not require further medical treatment for his work related 
injury after June 9, 2000. . . . Therefore, the Commission 
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concurs with Judge Marlowe's decision that Mr. Blair is not 
entitled to further benefits for his work related injury. 
(R., 109). 
Petitioner fails to recognize that under Utah law, once the basic 
prima facie elements of compensability are established under Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-401, (i.e., accident, medical causation and legal causation), 
the issue becomes the extent of liability. See Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In this case, medical causation 
was admitted as to the initial injury, but the issue as to the extent of 
compensability was still at issue. Respondents defended on the basis 
that, under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418, no further treatment was 
necessary on an industrial basis. Indeed, this section provides that 
medical expenses are only permitted if they are "necessary to treat the 
injured employee". This section reads as follows: 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial 
means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the 
injured employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 (emphasis added). 
Utah cases which have interpreted this provision are well settled 
that medical benefits will not be awarded to an injured worker when they 
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are not necessary to treat the injured employee. See, e.g. Fesler v. 
Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1985). Such is the 
case here where the medical benefits claimed by Petitioner are not 
necessary to treat his industrial injuries. 
In this case, the ALJ remitted the case directly to a panel of 
qualified medical experts for review. The medical panel opined, after 
reviewing the complete medical records exhibit and after evaluating 
Petitioner, that the proposed surgery claimed by Petitioner to his low 
back was not medically necessary on an industrial basis. They stated 
that while some of the treatment provided to Petitioner was appropriate 
on am industrial basis (i.e, treatment through June 9, 2000), after that 
date Petitioner returned to baseline with his pre-existing degenerative 
condition and, therefore, any treatment rendered after that date was 
necessitated by non-industrial caused conditions. (R., 61-63). The 
panel's report was also supported by the medical report of Dr. Gerald 
Moress who opined that the laminectomy / discectomy at L3/4 and L4/5 
will not relieve Petitioner's discomfort and therefore opined that surgery 
would not be a good option for him. Dr. Moress opined that treatment to 
February 5, 2007 was appropriate with the exception of chiropractic 
care. (R., 112 at 16-17). 
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Petitioner additionally argues that the Commission adjudicated 
matters that were not raised in the pleadings and "arbitrarily adjudicated 
facts not at issue." This is simply not correct. In the Answer to the 
Application for Hearing, Respondents specifically challenged Petitioner's 
claim for surgery (ie., the extent of medical care) and associated 
temporary total disability (R., 10-18). Additionally, this issue was 
included in the Petitioner's Pre Trial Disclosures and was fully in 
adjudicated at the hearing of this matter. (R., 32,113). Accordingly, 
Petitioner's statement that the ALJ or Commission exceeded their 
authority by adjudicating matters not raised in the pleadings is simply 
false and a misstatement of the evidentiary record. In any event, it is 
evident under Utah law that administrative pleadings are to be liberally 
construed. See Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT 
App 401, U11 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
Petitioner further argues that Respondents' failure to challenge 
medical causation is an "admission against interest". As noted above, 
Petitioner fails to recognize the appropriate legal test. In any event, it is 
well settled that formal evidentiary standards do not apply in Labor 
Commission proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802. Petitioner's 
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attempt to challenge on this ground is simply unfounded under Utah 
law. 
Point 2: The Commission Applied the Appropriate Legal 
Analysis. 
Petitioner next argues that the Court should reverse the 
Commission's ruling since the Commission applied the wrong legal 
standard of medical causation. The Petitioner cites to the leading case 
articulating the standard of medical causation of Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and also to two other cases which 
articulate the "direct and natural consequences rule" -i.e., McKean v. 
Mountain States Casing, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) and McKesson v. 
Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 10, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
Citing to McKesson and McKean, Petitioner argues the once medical 
causation is established, the employer remains liable for continued 
medical treatment if the industrial injury merely contributes to the need 
for medical treatment. Petitioner mistakenly cites an incorrect legal 
standard. Both McKesson and McKean articulate the standard of 
continuing benefits after a compensable industrial accident when the 
claimant is later involved in a non-industrial episode. In those cases, 
the Courts were asked to address whether the need for additional 
medical care and benefits was the liability of the initial industrial 
19 
accident when the claimant sustained additional injuries due to a 
subsequent intervening accident. For instance, in McKesson the Court 
held: 
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a 
subsequent aggravation to a compensable work place 
injury, a claimant need only prove that his subsequent 
injury is a natural result of his compensable primary 
injury. [Footnote] Stated more precisely, the claimant 
must establish that the subsequent aggravation is 
causally linked to the primary compensable injury. 
Furthermore, a claimant need not show that his original 
tragedy was the sole cause of his subsequent injury. 
Indeed, if the claimant can show that the initial 
work related accident is merely a contributing cause 
of this subsequent injury, the claimant has met his 
burden.2 
Id, at f 18. (Emphasis added). 
2
 In McKesson, the court held that a claimant's subsequent injury to 
his neck was the direct and natural consequence of his initial primary 
injury and, therefore, awarded additional workers' compensation benefits. 
In that case, the claimant had sustained a compensable head injury after 
being struck in the head by a 14-pound case and suffered two herniated 
discs. Following that accident, the claimant attempted to pull himself up 
into his pick-up truck and hit his head on the truck's door frame, 
aggravating his neck injury. The employer argued that this subsequent 
accident essentially broke the chain of medical causation, relieving the 
employer of additional workers' compensation benefits. The Commission 
and the Court of Appeals disagreed and found that the subsequent injury 
occurred after a "simple accident brought on by ordinary error and 
unintentional miscalculation/' Thus, the Commission concluded that the 
subsequent injury was a natural result of his compensable work place 
injury, insufficient to relieve the employer of financial responsibility. The 
court held that nothing in the record suggested that the claimant's 
subsequent injury resulted from "unreasonable conduct". 
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In this case the Medical Panel found that Mr. Blair's problems were 
due to pre-existing conditions that were not caused by the 1999 
accident. (R., 62). His back problems are not related to a non-industrial 
aggravation of an industrial injury. The McKesson analysis does not 
apply. 
In McKean the claimant suffered a compensable industrial hand 
injury. However, three months later he had a non-industrial episode 
where he sustained new injury from a burn that resulted in blistering. 
The Utah Supreme Court, citing to the direct and natural consequences 
rule found the carrier liable for the continuing consequences of the new 
injury since the claimant was not involved in negligent or intentional 
misconduct. McKean, 706 P.2d at 602. 
The direct and natural consequences rule articulated in McKesson 
and McKean does not apply here. Unlike those cases, Petitioner did not 
have any injury subsequent to the claimed industrial accident. Rather, 
the standard for compensability of his claim for addition benefits was 
properly adjudicated by the ALJ and Commission under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-418 under a reasonable and "necessary" medical standard. 
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Point 3: The ALJ's Interim Findings of Fact Were Legally 
Adequate. 
In points 3 and 4 of his Brief, Petitioner challenges the adequacy of 
the ALJ's factual findings articulated in her Interim Order. He argues 
that the ALJ's failure to reference an eight year history of leg and low 
back problems after the accident prejudiced Petitioner. He also argues 
that the ALJ improperly abdicated her fact finding obligations to the 
panel. Respondents again disagree. 
It is well settled that an administrative agency much make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to 
permit meaningful appellate review. See La Sal Oil v. Department ofEnvtl 
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Nyrehn v. 
Industrial Commission, this court announced the standard for 
administrative agency fact-finding: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the 
Commission, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. . . . The failure of an agency to make adequate 
findings of fact [***9] on material issues renders its findings 
arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence is clear, 
uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion. 
800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 
2006 UT App 179, If 16 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
22 
The ALJ's findings of fact and Commission's ultimate findings, 
which are the subject to challenge, are adequately detailed to reflect the 
central issue for determination under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 - that 
being the necessity of future care in the form of surgery. The ALJ and 
Commission's findings detail Petitioner's medical history and the material 
medical records which created the dispute necessitating panel review. 
The ALJ and Commission noted that Petitioner's treating doctor, Dr. 
Levitt recommended surgery in the form of a left L3-4 and L4-5 
laminotomy, decompression and possible discectomy. They noted that 
Dr. Gerald Moress disagreed with this recommendation. In addition, the 
ALJ gave Petitioner's complete medical records to the medical panel for 
their review in the Medical Records Exhibit which detailed the nature 
and scope of his treatment. 
Contrary to Petitioner's argument, there is no requirement under 
Utah law that the ALJ or Commission's findings of fact recite every 
medical record in the Medical Records Exhibit or, in this case, a full eight 
year history. Indeed, if Petitioner felt that some of his medical history 
was improperly omitted he should have filed a motion or objection with 
the court to the Interim Order. Likewise, if he felt the questions to the 
panel were improper he should have filed an objection to the ALJ's 
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charging order of December 19, 2007. He did neither. Indeed, 
Petitioner never objected to the alleged deficiencies in the ALJ's Interim 
Order nor the questions asked in the charging order under after he 
received an unfavorable ruling. Such a wait-and-see approach is 
improper and hardly shows any prejudice to him. In any event, it does 
not appear that any of the medical records Petitioner cites alter the 
underlying issue of his claim for additional medical care in the form of 
surgery nor does it show that the ALJ or Commission incorrectly 
evaluated this case. The ALJ and Commission properly cited to those 
medical records which were material and relevant to the issues raised 
and properly performed their fact finding duties. Likewise, the ALJ did 
not abdicate her fact finding duties to a medical panel as Petitioner 
would suggest. In Speirs v. Southern Utah University, the Court held: 
[*P9] "To award compensation, the Commission must 
determine that an accident has occurred and that there is a 
causal connection between the accident and the injury 
claimed." Pittsburgh Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 
1370 (Utah 1983). This requires that the Commission make 
findings of fact and draw conclusions of law. In difficult cases, 
the opinions of a medical panel may be of assistance to the 
Commission in determining whether benefits should be 
awarded because the medical panel provides the Commission 
with the benefit of its medical expertise. See Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Keller, 657 P.2d at 1370; IGA Food Fair 
v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). The medical panel 
is empowered to study, take X-rays, and perform tests as it 
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may determine necessary or desirable in rendering its 
opinion. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(a) (Supp. 2002). 
[*P10] However, even when a medical panel is convened, the 
ALJ/Commission is always the ultimate [***7] fact finder. See 
Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); accord IGA Food Fair, 584 P.2d at 830. Thus, while the 
ALJ/Commission may convene a medical panel to review 
applicants' medical condition, the ALJ/Commission may not 
abdicate its fact-finding responsibility to the medical panel. 
See Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 
1084 (Utah 1986). 
Speirs v. S. Utah Univ., 2002 UT App 389, P10 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
The court additionally stated in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n: 
It is not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts in 
the factual evidence regarding the injured party's activities. 
Section 35-1-85 of the Code places that responsibility solely 
on the Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.). 
Under Allen, as before, the medical panel is only to take the 
[**13] facts as found by the administrative law judge and 
consider them in light of its medical expertise to assist the 
administrative law judge in deciding whether medical cause 
has been proven. The medical panel strays beyond its 
province when it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the 
administrative law judge improperly abdicates his function if 
he permits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 
P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). 
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 
1986). 
Petitioner argues that the ALJ "foisted" fact finding responsibility 
on the medical panel since the ALJ did not cite to every medical record 
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within an eight year period after the industrial accident and did not 
describe, in detail, the nature and scope of his medical condition, leaving 
the panel to "do this job". Petitioner is again mistaken in his argument. 
The ALJ was certainly not required to list every medical record contained 
in the joint Medical Records Exhibit in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Interim Order. The ALJ cited to the material records 
relevant to the medical dispute and provided an overview to the panel of 
his medical history. The ALJ then remitted this case to the panel to 
complete their assignment pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R. 602-
2-2. Such action was appropriate under Utah law. See Intermountain 
Health Care Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In Intermountain the Court stated that although the medical panel 
is responsible for making findings regarding disputed medical aspects of 
a compensation claim, its role is limited. The medical panel may not act 
as a fact finder in the same way the administrative law judge finds facts, 
nor may the panel base its conclusions on the assumption of facts not in 
evidence, and the medical panel may not, except in limited 
circumstances, assess the credibility of the claimant's testimony. 
However, a medical panel acted within its authority in considering all 
evidence pertaining to the injury-causing incident and forming a medical 
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conclusion based on that evidence. Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2. Such 
is the case here. The panel did not stray beyond its province in 
attempting to resolve a factual dispute; rather, the panel took the facts 
as found by the administrative law judge and considered them in light of 
their medical expertise to assist the administrative law judge in deciding 
what future care was needed on an industrial basis. 
Point 4: The Commissions Finding that Petitioner Does not 
Require Back Surgery on an Industrial Basis Is 
Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
Petitioner also argues that the Commission's finding - that he does 
not require back surgery- is not supported by substantial evidence. He 
additionally argues that there are insufficient findings defeating his 
ability to "marshall" the evidence. 
It is well-settled that the Court of Appeals will review the record to 
determine if there is substantial evidence to support a Commission's 
factual findings. See Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 888 
P.2d 707, 710-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Substantial evidence is more 
than a scintilla of evidence, though "less than the weight of the 
evidence." See id. Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that will convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion. See id. To evaluate whether a finding is supported by 
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substantial evidence, the court examines the record as a whole, weighing 
evidence that both supports and detracts from the finding. See id. 
Here, the record shows that there was substantial evidence to 
support the Commission's findings that Petitioner does not require low 
back surgery on an industrial basis. The Commission found, consistent 
with the ALJ, the medical panel, and Dr. Moress that surgery was not 
necessary on an industrial basis. The Commission found: 
Even though Precision Tool admits that the accident 
medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a low back injury, such 
and admission does not imply that the accident caused all of 
Mr. Blair's low back problems following the accident. After 
examining Mr. Blair and reviewing his medical records, the 
medical panel determined that Mr. Blair suffered from a pre-
existing degenerative condition unrelated to his employment 
that caused his continuing low back problems. As a result, 
the panel concluded that Mr. Blair did not suffer any periods 
of instability in 2007 because of his work related injury and 
did not require further medical treatment for his work related 
injury after June 9, 2000. 
The medical panel's findings are persuasive because the 
panel is impartial in this matter, and because its findings are 
based on the evidence in the record. The Commission is also 
persuaded by the fact that the medical panel had the benefit 
of collegial review of Mr. Blair's relevant medical history. 
The Commission finds that the medical panel's consideration 
of the extend of Mr. Blair's work related injury was 
appropriate and adopts the panel's conclusions. Therefore, 
the Commission concurs with Judge Marlowe's decision that 
Mr. Blair is not entitled to further benefits for his work 
related injury. 
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In addition the Commission's findings are supported by other 
doctors. 
For instance, Dr. Gerald Moress opined in his February 5, 2007 
report that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-4 and L4-L5 would not 
relieve the Petitioner's pain and discomfort. (R., 112 at 16). Dr. Moress 
stated that since Petitioner has no clear evidence of radiculopathy, he 
would get no relief from the back surgery. He further opined that the 
Petitioner should continue on a self procured program of spinal 
stretching, strengthening, and cardiovascular exercise. 
Moreover, the medical panel, reviewed Petitioner's complete 
medical history and examined Petitioner. The panel opined that 
Petitioner's ongoing problems are not related to the industrial injury. 
The panel states: 
It is agreed (with Dr. Leavitt) that the L4/5 disc is much more 
likely causative of his current discomfort, owing to 
radiographic appearance. However, the medical panel 
disagrees with Dr. Levitt's recommendation for a lumbar 
laminectomy an discectomy for what she describes as "mostly 
low back pain with some leg pain", agreeing with Dr. Moress 
that such a procedure would likely be disappointing to the 
patient who has primarily low back pain which would not be 
expected to benefit at all from that procedure. That procedure 
would be done for degenerative disc disease and not the L5-
Sl protrusion related to the May 21, 1999 incident. 
R., 63. 
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These records are sufficient to meet the appropriate legal standard 
and convince a reasonable mind that the conclusions of the Commission 
are appropriate. The Court should reject Petitioner's arguments that the 
ALJ/Commission's findings are incomplete. In any event, the only 
medical records cited by Petitioner to support his argument that he 
requires surgery on an industrial basis are those of Dr. Levitt. This 
certainly does not meet the marshalling requirement under Utah law. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (requiring appellant 
to list all evidence supporting Commission's findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate when viewed in light most 
favorable to court below). On this basis, Respondents submit that 
Petitioner has failed in his burden to marshall the evidence in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Commissions's Order 
Affirming ALJ's Decision. The Commission and ALJ applied the 
appropriate legal standards in evaluating this case under Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-418. The Commission's determination that Petitioner does 
not require surgery on an industrial basis is reasonable and rationale 
and supported by substantial evidence in the record including that of the 
medical panel and Dr. Moress. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
i OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 07-0162 
Judge Deidre Marlowe 
Hearing: July 10, 2007 
Appearances: 
Richard Burke for the Petitioner 
Thomas Sturdy for the Respondents 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ollie M. Blair filed an application for hearing on February 17, 2007 requesting medical 
expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation, temporary partial 
compensation, permanent partial compensation, interest and travel expenses. The Petitioner 
claimed that on May 12, 1999 he injured his low back. 
Precision Tool, Great American Alliance Insurance Co., and Ohio Casualty Insurance 
filed an Answer on March 23, 2007 indicating that Great American had written the policy which 
covered Precision Tool at the time of the Petitioner's accident, and that Great American had 
assigned the policy to Ohio Casualty Insurance, which is the responsible carrier on the 
Petitioner's claim. Respondents concede legal and medical causation. However, they defend on 
the grounds that the Petitioner's surgery is not necessary to treat his industrial injuries. 
Findings of Fact and Interim Order was issued on October 31, 2007, determining that the 
case needed to be sent to a medical panel regarding the necessity of medical treatment and any 
periods of instability for work. I assigned Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis to chair the panel; he associated 
Dr. Joel Dall as a member of the panel. The medical panel reviewed the Interim Findings, 
medical records, diagnostics, and examined the Petitioner. The medical panel then filed a report 
on March 6, 2008 with the Adjudication Division. Copies were promptly distributed to the 
parties. The Petitioner filed an objection to the medical panel report on March 20, 2007, 
objecting to the report because the medical panel addressed issues of medical causation, an issue 
which had already been conceded by the Respondents. The objection is overruled, as discussed 
feelow, and the report is admitted into evidence. The case is now ready for final order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT A. J CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
On May 12, 1999 the Petitioner was working for Precision Tool as a welder/fitter. He 
earned $12.43 per hour working 40 hours a week. He was single with 2 dependent children. 
This gives the Petitioner an average weekly wage of $497.20 and a temporary total compensation 
rate of $341.00. 
On May 12, 1999 the Petitioner was trying to center a 16" 200 lb. vertical piece of pipe 
down into a base plate. A crane was holding the pipe and Petitioner was pushing on it with his 
hands, attempting to position it correctly. While pushing and pulling on the pipe the Petitioner 
felt a pop in his back, which "tightened up." The Petitioner thought things were alright and 
finished working his shift. 
However the next morning the Petitioner had enormous pain in his back. He reported the 
accident and took the day off. Shortly thereafter the Petitioner went to see Dr. Carston Johnson. 
The Petitioner felt numbness going down the back of his left thigh (the diagram on ME p. 79 
showing the pain as in the right thigh is incorrect.) 
Over the years the Petitioner sought treatment for his back now and then when it would 
"act up." Eventually surgery was recommended by Dr. Jodie Levitt. On February 7, 2007 Dr. 
Levitt filled out a Summary of Medical Record indicating a medical causal relation between the 
industrial accident and the Petitioner's herniated disc. Dr. Levitt took the Petitioner off work 
from May 12,1999 to May 16,1999. He recommended surgery in the form of left L3-4 and L4-
5 laminotomy, decompression and possible discectomy. ME p. 18. 
Dr. Douglas Davis, D.C. took the Petitioner off work from April 10,2007 to April 15, 
2007. ME p. 41. This is the period for which the Petitioner claims temporary total 
compensation. 
Dr. Gerald Moress performed an independent medical exam on February 5, 2007. He 
opined that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-L4 and L4-L5 would not relieve the Petitioner's 
pain and discomfort. ME p. 16. With regard to past care, all has been necessary except the 
chiropractic care. The Petitioner was at maximum medical improvement as of the IME 
evaluation. The Petitioner should continue on a self procured program of spinal stretching, 
strengthening, and cardiovascular exercise. A 2-3 week course of physical therapy will refresh 
the self-program and provide a good transition. ME p. 17. 
Findings of Fact and Interim Order was issued on October 31, 2007, determining that the 
case needed to be sent to a medical panel regarding the necessity of medical treatment and any 
periods of instability for work. I assigned Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis to chair the panel; he associated 
Dr. Joel Dall as a member of the panel. The medical panel reviewed the Interim Findings, 
medical records, diagnostics, and examined the Petitioner. The medical panel then filed a report 
on March 6,2008 with the Adjudication Division. 
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The medical panel opined that the medical treatment provided to the Petitioner through 
June 9, 2000 was necessitated by the Petitioner's industrial injuries. However, after that date, the 
Petitioner had returned to baseline with his preexisting degenerative condition (his industrially-
caused disc protrusion has resolved), and therefore any treatment rendered after that date was not 
necessitated by industrially-caused conditions. Likewise, any times of instability for work in 
2007 were not caused by any industrial injury. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Causation 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-401 provides that an employee who is injured "by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment" can receive benefits. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted a two-part test causation analysis suggested by Professor Larson. The first component 
deals with "legal causation" while the second addresses "medical causation." 
There is no dispute that the incident on May 12,1999 arose by accident out of the course 
and scope of the Petitioner's employment with Precision Tool, resulting in injuries, and thus 
legal and medical causation requirements are met. 
2. Medical Expenses 
Under U.C.A. § 34A-2-418 the employer or the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable 
sums for medical, nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial means, 
appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee. 
The Petitioner objects that the medical panel, in answering the question of medical 
necessity, first examined the question of medical causation. Because the issue of medical 
causation was already conceded, the panel should not have evaluated this question. However, 
the question put to the medical panel was concerning what care was necessary to treat industrial 
conditions. The first thing the panel must determine in answering this question is which 
conditions are industrial. It was therefore appropriate for the panel to examine this question. 
The panel did opine that industrially-caused conditions no longer need medical care. 
This essentially agrees with the opinion given by Dr. Moress that the Petitioner reached 
maximum medical improvement and should involve himself in home exercise. These opinions 
represent the preponderance of the evidence. I therefore conclude that the Respondents are not 
liable for any further medical expenses with regard to this claim. 
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3. Compensation Claims 
The preponderance of the evidence shows that the Petitioner's claims for temporary total 
compensation in 2007 was not caused by his industrial injuries and thus will be dismissed. 
No evidence of other types of compensation claims was put forward at the hearing and 
thus these will also be dismissed. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Hearing filed by Ollie Blair against 
Precision Tool Great American Alliance Insurance Co., and Ohio Casualty Insurance is 
dismissed, with all claims therein denied. 
DATED this ^ day of May 2008. 
Deidre Marlowe 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
Ollie M Blair vs. Precision Tool and/or Great American Alliance Ins Co; Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Case No. 07-0162 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on May 6, 2008, to 
the persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Ollie M Blair 
1598 W Palmer Park Ln 
South Jordan UT 84095 
Precision Tool 
175 N 100 E 
HyrumUT 84319 
Great American Alliance Ins Co 
Tom Sturdy Esq Designated Agent 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Corp Service Co Designated Agent 
Gateway Twr E Ste 900 10 E S Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84133 
Richard Burke Esq 
7390 S Creek Rd #104 
Sandy UT 84093 
Thomas Sturdy Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Clerk 
Adjudication Division 
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OLLIE M. BLAIR, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PRECISION TOOL; GREAT AMERICAN 
ALLIANCE INSURANCE CO.; and 
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE, 
Respondents. 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALJ'S DECISION 
Case No. 07-0162 
Ollie M. Blair asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Marlowe's denial of Mr. Blair's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Title 
34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §63G-
4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Blair claims benefits for a low-back injury the he sustained on May 12, 1999, while 
working for Precision Tool. Judge Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing, at which Precision Tool 
conceded that Mr. Blair had suffered a compensable injury. However, Precision Tool disputed 
whether Mr. Blair's continuing low-back problems were work-related and whether he was entitled to 
further benefits or medical treatment for his continuing low-back problems. 
Judge Marlowe appointed an impartial medical panel to determine the necessity of further 
medical treatment and any periods of instability pertaining to Mr. Blair's work-related injury. The 
medical panel determined that Mr. Blair's work-related injury did not cause medical instability in 
2007 or require further treatment after June of 2000. Judge Marlowe adopted the medical panel's 
findings and denied further benefits to Mr. Blair. Mr. Blair challenges Judge Marlowe's decision by 
arguing that he is entitled to further benefits because Precision Tool admitted that the accident was 
the medical cause of his low-back injury. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On May 12, 1999, Mr. Blair was working for Precision Tool trying to center a 200-pound 
pipe into place when he felt a pop in his low back, which then tightened up. Mr. Blair finished his 
shift, but experienced severe pain in his low back and numbness in his left thigh following the 
accident. Precision Tool paid Mr. Blair's medical expenses as well as permanent partial and 
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temporary total disability compensation following the accident. 
Mr. Blair sought occasional treatment for his low back over the next several years. Mr. 
Blair's treating physician, Dr. Davis, took Mr. Blair off work from April 10,2007, to April 15,2007, 
due to his low-back condition. Another of Mr. Blair's treating physicians, Dr. Levitt, recommended 
surgery as treatment for Mr. Blair's continuing low-back problems. Precision Tool's medical expert, 
Dr. Moress, evaluated Mr. Blair and opined that surgery would not alleviate Mr. Blair's continuing 
low-back problems. 
Based on these conflicting medical opinions, Judge Marlowe appointed an impartial medical 
panel to determine whether Mr. Blair's work-related injury caused any period of medical instability 
or required further medical treatment. The medical panel determined that the treatment Mr. Blair 
received through June 9, 2000, was necessary for his work-related low-back injury, but any 
subsequent treatment was not related to the accident. The panel also found that any periods of 
medical instability in 2007 were not caused by Mr. Blair's work-related injury. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Mr. Blair claims that he is entitled to further benefits for his work-related low-back injury. 
Mr. Blair asserts that because Precision Tool admitted the accident was the medical cause of his low-
back injury, the medical panel's findings related to medical causation are erroneous and Judge 
Marlowe's decision to deny further benefits based on the panel's report was incorrect. However, 
Precision Tool's admission that the accident was the medical cause of Mr. Blair's injury does not 
preclude the Commission from adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr. 
Blair's work-related low-back problems. 
Even though Precision Tool admits that the accident medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a 
low-back injury, such an admission does not imply that that accident caused all of Mr. Blair's low-
back problems following the accident. After examining Mr. Blair and reviewing his medical records, 
the medical panel determined that Mr. Blair suffered from a pre-existing degenerative condition 
unrelated to his employment that caused his continuing low-back problems. As a result, the panel 
concluded that Mr. Blair did not suffer any periods of medical instability in 2007 because of his 
work-related injury and did not require any further medical treatment for his work-related injury after 
June 9, 2000. 
The medical panel's findings are persuasive because the panel is impartial in this matter, and 
because its findings are based on the evidence in the record. The Commission is also persuaded by 
the fact that the medical panel had the benefit of collegial review of Mr. Blair's relevant medical 
history. The Commission finds that the medical panel's consideration of the extent of Mr. Blair's 
work-related injury was appropriate and adopts the panel's conclusions. Therefore, the Commission 
concurs with Judge Marlowe's decision that Mr. Blair is not entitled to further benefits for his work-
related injury. 
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ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision of May 6, 2008, in this matter. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this jS^day of July, 2010. 
Sherrie Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Ollie 
M Blair, Case No. 07-0162, was mailed first class postage prepaid this /5**d.ay of July, 2010, to the 
following: 
Ollie M Blair 
1415 Harris Ave 
Salt Lake City UT 84104 
Precision Tool 
175N100 E 
HyrumUT 84319 
Great American Alliance Ins Co 
Tom Sturdy Esq Designated Agent 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Corp Service Co Designated Agent 
Gateway Twr E Ste 900 10 E S Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84133 
Richard Burke Esq 
7390 S Creek Rd #104 
Sandy UT 84093 
Thomas Sturdy Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
fot/fr 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
